
Presenter: Serene Ho
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: This paper documents the lobbying behavior of artificial intelligence (AI) hiring firms on labor-related issues using a novel linkage of LinkedIn job vacancy microdata and federal lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. I identify AI-adopting firms as those posting AI-related job vacancies, and classify lobbying disclosures into topic categories using a dictionary-based keyword approach applied to LBR issue text. To address the endogeneity of AI adoption, I exploit ChatGPT's November 2022 release as a source of quasi-experimental variation, comparing firms induced to adopt AI following the shock to firms that did not adopt AI over the sample period. I find directionally consistent evidence that AI-hiring firms increase lobbying attention to workforce development topics and decrease attention to workforce supply topics relative to non-hiring firms. These findings offer novel firm-level evidence on the labor lobbying priorities of AI-hiring firms.
Presenter: Yue Lin
Discussant: Pablo Pinto
Abstract: Why do governments increasingly invoke national security to criticize foreign MNEs, and how do MNEs respond? I argue that economic securitization (ES)—the framing of foreign investment as a national security threat—is a salient political risk with a distinct life cycle. ES activates when politicians face competitive elections in constituencies exposed to foreign competition. Under emergent ES, MNEs substitute lobbying for societal engagement to build legitimacy. Once ES consolidates, high-profile social engagement becomes a liability and local embeddedness now reads as suspicious foreign influence, which prompts retrenchment from both political and social channels. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design with an original dataset of 5,484 U.S. legislator-session observations (2005–2024), a panel of 634 foreign MNEs (2013–2024), and 21 fieldwork interviews, I find empirical support. Overall, this paper theorizes ES as a novel political risk and offers managerial guidance for global firms operating in increasingly politicized contexts.
Presenter: Pei-Hsun Hsieh, Daniela Alva
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: Capital income accounts for a substantial share of overall income inequality in the United States. Yet public opinion on capital income taxation remains understudied. This study examines whether perceptions of risk-taking and attributions of stock-market earnings to effort or luck shape support for taxing equity income and broader redistributive policies. We conducted a vignette experiment measuring preferred capital income tax rates across income brackets, attitudes toward the preferential tax treatment of equity income, and support for broader social welfare policies. We draw on two pilot studies, one using an online quota-based sample and another using a student sample. We find that perceived stock-market risk shapes support for taxing investment income among non-stock owners, but not among stock owners. In the quota-based sample, stock owners became less supportive of preferential tax treatment when presented with information emphasizing market volatility and luck rather than effort or skill.
Presenter: Ben Gelman
Discussant: Jane Sumner
Abstract: The rise of mega-donors in American politics has revealed the importance of the partisan leanings of executives, how they compare to those of employees in the same industries, and how these divisions vary by industry. My research explores the trajectory of executive and employee partisan divides in the period of 2012-2024. Using data on voter registration and executive political giving, this research maps the partisan gap between employees and their respective employers. Results reveal that employee partisan preferences are remarkably stable across both sector and time, while executive preferences vary much more both between industries and over time. In recent years, we also see executives moving toward the Democratic Party, leading to an increasingly smaller gap between employers and their employees, who are in general more Democratic. My findings indicate that sector has recently become more important than the employee/employer divide in predicting executive partisanship, and that American executives have become more politically fragmented in recent years.
Presenter: Lucas Kreuzer
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: What accounts for limited policy feedback in rural America? Scholars portray rural voters’ shift to the Republican Party as unidirectional. Economic hardship bred resentment (Cramer 2016, Mettler and Brown 2025), making them susceptible to elite-manufactured culture wars (Hacker and Pierson 2020) and unlikely to blame politicians for harmful economic policies (Frank 2005). Yet three decades earlier, rural voters in the Upper Midwest punished Reagan for his mishandling of the largest agricultural crisis since the Great Depression – the Farm Crisis of the 1980s. In this paper, we argue that grassroots organizations, limited nationalization, and high policy traceability/visibility enabled policy feedback. We draw on hundreds of letters sent to the USDA to demonstrate that farmers linked policymaking with their own dislocation. Furthermore, we employ a dataset of township election returns from 1964-2024 in IA, MN, and WI (N=101,334) to show that affected voters turned to the Democratic Party and the effects persisted.
Presenter: Christian Hosam
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: In the wake of the 2024 elections, there was much ink spilled over the potential new and diverse conservative coalition that helped propel Donald Trump to a second term. However, is it the case that much of the inroads that Trump made was actually a subset of the population that have gotten less and less out of being politically active so have become more volatile voters. In order to understand longer term changes and feelings of disaffection rather than simply focusing on elections of episodic events, I stitched together multiple waves of the Cooperative Election Study (2006-2024) and then merged them to county-year level Quarterly Workforce Indicator data on job churn as a proxy for localized economic context. The independent variable is the amount of job turnover at the county level per year and the dependent variable is the level of correlation between one's retrospective view of the economy and their view of their personal economic conditions. I find that major economic crisis moments precipitate a different relationship at the individual level between personal and national evaluations. When county fixed effects along with controls are included in the model, the baseline between personal and national evaluations is is normally non-significant but accounting for crisis-like periods (e.g. the 2008 recession, the Pandemic) the linkage is very strong and robust. I then find that local job churn, while not significant in its own right, has a secondary effect of shaping the sensitivity of individuals during those key periods. In other words, the relationship is period-dependent and strong in crisis moments but non-significant at the baseline. In addition, when looking at this through a partisan lens, I find that Republicans are much more likely to have this correlative relationship than Democrats in all specifications. I have not yet found (though I have more supplementary analyses to do), a distinct relationship across racial lines. The periodized sensitivity follows roughly the same trend line for all racial groups.
Presenter: Debora Villalvazo
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: Local governments in the United States have paid billions in settlements and judgments for police-related liability, yet little is known about the claims behind these costs or how cities manage such risks. This study analyzes municipal police liability in California, using original records to build a dataset of claims from fiscal years 2010–2011 through 2023–2024. By examining how cities experience, finance, and manage police-related claims—through insurance, self-insurance, and risk pools—this research reveals who brings claims, the types of incidents involved, and the resulting financial exposure. The analysis provides new insights into how local governments absorb the financial impact of policing, highlighting liability claims as a critical but often overlooked window into the costs of governance.
Presenter: David Nguyen
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: Local governments in the United States have become increasingly specialized and fragmented, with special-purpose districts comprising the majority of governmental bodies. Yet little is known about how this institutional complexity shapes local mass political behavior. I argue that greater specialization expands the number of local offices voters must monitor and evaluate, increasing cognitive burden and information costs that ultimately shape political behavior. Using data linking California’s special district boundaries to voting precincts, cities, and ZIP codes, I demonstrate that more specialized jurisdictions have significantly higher voter roll-off and stronger incumbency voting in city-level races. I trace these patterns to the larger number of special district elections voters face in areas with more specialization. Survey experiment results further show that voting in more local contests increases perceived cognitive burden from voting. These findings provide systematic evidence that local government structures shape mass political behavior, with implications for local representation and policy.
Please join the CAPE-Junior Working group for our professionalization panel on making your research available for non-academic audiences, featuring the following editors:
Each editor will share some information and advice for publishing at their outlet, and there will be plenty of time for audience Q&A.
Presenter: Jaewook Lee
Discussant: Talbot Andrews
Abstract: Do the environmental costs of AI infrastructure generate electoral responses? Data centers, the physical backbone of artificial intelligence, impose locally concentrated demands on electricity, water, land use, and air quality while promising uneven economic benefits. This paper examines whether exposure to data centers is associated with changes in U.S. electoral behavior. Combining geocoded data center locations with county-level 2024 presidential election returns, I find that data center exposure is associated with greater Green/protest voting, while broader electoral punishment of the incumbent-party candidate is less evident. These findings suggest that AI infrastructure is politically visible even at this early stage of diffusion, with its electoral consequences in the 2024 election expressed most clearly through environmental and protest-oriented voting. I complement this analysis with survey experimental evidence examining how citizens evaluate the trade-offs between AI development and local costs.
Presenter: Sebastien Malo
Discussant: TBD
Abstract: Since the early 2000s, the U.S. Department of Defense has emerged, alongside the Department of Energy, as one of the two most central federal drivers of clean-energy R&D, and this funding has persisted through bouts of political hostility. The durability is puzzling: the organized constituency that interest-group theories credit with sustaining civilian clean-energy policy has no analog here. I argue that durability instead rests on bureaucratic agency. In the defense monopsony, where protective coalitions cannot form, program managers sustain politically exposed work through two channels: discretion, reframing clean energy in the sitting principal's terms, and autonomy, concealing it in operational euphemism; I also consider whether interservice rivalry independently reinforces this resilience. Drawing on grant and patent data, budget exhibits and interviews, I trace this reframing and, in ongoing work, how these channels reshape the surviving R&D portfolio. The paper establishes bureaucratic discretion as a complementary channel of policy durability, alongside constituency politics.
Please join the CAPE-Junior Working group for our first meeting of the new academic year! We will be hosting a professionalization panel on publishing books and articles as junior scholars, featuring the following editors:
Each editor will share some information and advice for publishing at their journal or press, and there will be plenty of time for audience Q&A.
Presenter: Karina Alpayeva (UC-Riverside)
Discussant: Timothy Weaver (University at Albany, SUNY)
Abstract: This project investigates why tipping became institutionalized in the United States but remained marginal in the United Kingdom, despite both being liberal market economies. I argue that tipping in the U.S. emerged as a response to global economic pressures, neoliberal labor reforms, and weak union resistance—allowing employers to shift wage burdens onto consumers. Legal frameworks like the tipped minimum wage and strong tipping norms further reinforced this system. In contrast, the U.K. maintained stronger wage protections and weaker cultural support for tipping. Using comparative historical analysis, process tracing, and typological theorizing, the project develops a theory of when and why societies adopt informal wage supplements like tipping. Drawing on legal records, union documents, economic data, and cultural discourse, the research contributes to debates on labor justice, informal institutions, and the political economy of wage-setting.
Presenter: Ayelet Carmeli (MIT)
Discussant: Katherine Rader (University at Albany, SUNY)
Abstract: How were working-class Americans first integrated into the financial system? This paper traces the rise of savings banks in early 19th-century Northeast U.S., established by social reformers to encourage thrift among the working poor. These institutions offered safe, interest-bearing accounts to promote self-help and reduce reliance on poor relief. The paper follows their development and state endorsement through special charters and regulation, culminating in the Reconstruction-era Freedman’s Savings Bank—a project that extended saving opportunities to the formerly enslaved but operated under far looser federal oversight than state-chartered mutual savings banks, leaving it vulnerable to mismanagement and collapse. By embedding savings within a broader project of moral reform, these institutions laid foundations for a welfare model based on conditional inclusion rather than redistribution. The paper develops the concept of “financial citizenship,” in which access to savings is framed as both a right and a duty, and shows how international and inter-state institutional diffusion shaped early U.S. state-building.
Presenter: Shria Pallati (University of Missouri)
Discussant: Amber Wichowsky (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Abstract: How do voters across different income groups provide incumbent support in US Presidential elections when inflation is their most important problem? In the 2024 US Presidential election, a staggering 96% of voters for Donald Trump claimed inflation was important for their vote, compared to 79% of Kamala Harris’ voters. It is typically argued that high-income voters will rank inflation as their “most important problem” due to stress over depreciating assets and savings. However, I posit that low-income voters will show greater concern over inflation than their high-income counterparts due to inflation’s disproportionate effect on inelastic goods, such as food, that represent much of their expenditure, the makeup of their asset profiles, and a lower level of economic literacy. Thus, low-income voters are more likely than high-income voters to punish candidates perceived to be responsible for their most important problem. I empirically test this using a linear probability model and a sample of US voters drawn from the Most Important Problem Dataset (MIPD).* I show that, indeed, low-income voters are more likely than their high-income counterparts to prioritize inflation as their most important problem and, consequently, punish the incumbent at higher rates. This issue is particularly salient for policy evaluation and as a relevant campaigning tool. By challenging assumptions about income groups in existing theory, this study provides a novel perspective on the propensity of economic voting for them. It also sheds light on the responsiveness of an electorate to the economy, supporting a natural extension of economic voting theory.
Presenter: Miranda Yaver (University of Pittsburgh)
Discussant: Andrew Kelly (California State University, East Bay)
Abstract: Medicare enrollment is notoriously complex, and Abaluck and Gruber's seminal (2011) analysis of prescription drug coverage highlights that not only do many seniors choose their plans incorrectly, but this can be costly. Seniors are confronted with a host of decisions: original versus privatized Medicare (Medicare Advantage, where there is an average of 43 plans from which to choose) and if the former, whether to enroll in Medigap (10 plans) and Part D (average of 14 plans). This places substantial health literacy demands (which are unevenly distributed) at a time of not only greater health needs and diminished income, but also, potentially, cognitive decline. Consequently, this is a natural setting for examining health insurance enrollment barriers through the lens of administrative burden, or the experience of policy as being onerous, and resulting inequities. When one chooses a suboptimal plan, they may face greater health costs, leading to care postponement or medical debt. Drawing on a new nationwide survey of 1,964 seniors, I examine the administrative burdens experienced by seniors enrolling in Medicare plans, the extent to which their plan choices align with their priorities amid problems of choice overload, and the extent to which coverage barriers through prior authorization and related denials (which likewise demand health literacy to remedy through appeal) lead to discontinuities in coverage (and in turn, care) for seniors, especially seniors from margininalized backgrounds. The paper then offers solutions for how to better promote equitable access to health care for America's seniors.
Presenter: Jacob Loewenberg Ball (Rutgers University)
Discussant: Discussant: Jessica Trounstine (Vanderbilt University)
Abstract: This study examines the transformation of American social rented housing during the 1960s and 1970s, a period when lawmakers and federal officials from both parties advanced policies embedding private interests into low-income rental housing. By the 1970s, these privatizing reforms interacted with the Nixon administration’s push to limit federal fiscal responsibility and delegate authority to state and local governments, curbing an expanding subsidized rental supply and reinforcing racial inequalities. Initially, a shift toward increasing reliance on private housing embedded market logics into the policies of low-income housing provision. Subsequently, despite the enactment of fair housing legislation, federal devolution intensified the spatial politics of inequality. This bolstered white suburban communities’ ability to limit in-migration of lower-income, often racial and ethnic minority households. Ultimately, this research asks how and why American housing policy prioritizes exchange-value over use-value and examines the distributional consequences of this emphasis.
Presenter: Joshua A. Basseches (Tulane University)
Discussant: Sandeep Vaheesan (Open Markets Institute)
Abstract: Investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) occupy a unique and essential space within the American political economy. They are for-profit, monopoly corporations providing an essential public service. In this paper, I develop four characteristics of this industry that I theorize, in combination, make it uniquely able to capture its regulators. I then use the case of the distributive politics of renewable portfolio standards in five U.S. states to illustrate how IOUs combine these four characteristics in order to prevail over competing political actors in every case, irrespective of variation in state context. I conclude with a comparison to other industries which share some, but not all, of the four characteristics in order to further illustrate the “uniqueness” of IOUs while also suggesting that lesser degrees of capture are still highly likely in these other industries. My findings have implications for both American electricity policy and for the study of business power generally.
Presenters: Simone Paci (Stanford University) and Julian Gerez (UC Irvine)
Discussant: Discussant: Isaac William Martin (UC San Diego)
Abstract: Why do excise taxes exhibit chronic compliance gaps even in high-capacity states? We argue that vice taxes invert the fiscal contract: rather than funding valued public goods, revenues are earmarked for programs—cessation campaigns, inspections, enforcement—that directly harm retailers’ business interests. We call this dynamic negative public good provision. To examine compliance under these conditions, we partner with the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (CDTFA) to conduct the first large-scale randomized controlled trial of excise inspections in the United States. Random assignment of inspections across ~30,000 licensed tobacco retailers is paired with baseline and follow-up surveys measuring deterrence, compliance costs, social norms, and fiscal contract mechanisms. The design provides causal evidence on inspection effects, heterogeneity across compliance paradigms, and spillovers within retail networks. Findings will advance theories of tax compliance and inform cost-effective enforcement strategies in sin-tax domains, with implications for both revenue collection and public health policy.
Presenter: Giulia Leila Travaglini (Columbia University)
Discussant: Amanda Kennard (Stanford University)
Abstract: This paper examines how managers’ preferences for green energy influence corporate political behavior in the U.S., focusing on lobbying and campaign contributions related to environmental policy. Using a novel dataset that links natural disaster exposure, used as a proxy for changes in perceptions of climate risk and green energy, with managers and fossil fuel companies headquarters political activity at the county level, the paper preliminary results indicate that polluting firms, especially those in Democratic areas, hide their political behavior on green energy and environment related policies after disasters. While from visual evidence it looks like managers in fossil fuel firms tend to shift campaign contributions toward Democratic politicians following climate shocks, these firms do not adopt explicitly pro-climate lobbying positions. Instead, they engage in more ambiguous political strategies, with implications for regulatory feedback and the broader politics of climate adaptation.
Presenter: Junwoo Suh (UC Berkeley)
Discussant: Max Kagan (Columbia University)
Abstract: Many private corporations across diverse sectors and countries of origin have lobbied Congress on legislation that promotes LGBTQ rights. Existing studies imply that the high costs of lobbying, diffuse benefits, and non-excludable outcomes of social policy would deter firms from lobbying on issues such as federal legislation on LGBTQ rights. What motivates firms to attempt to influence legislation on civil rights and liberties like the Equality Act and the Respect for Marriage Act? I argue that firms in industrialized economies face dual objectives, of minimizing production costs and having access to talent. In this trade-off, firms choosing to locate in lower-wage and lower-regulation regions (Relocating Right) may lobby for the advancement of civil rights in those regions (Lobbying Left) in order to attract and sustain talent. This study shows how workers' labor market leverage, firms' production costs, and cross-regional social policy heterogeneity jointly shape firms' decision to lobby politicians for civil rights protection.
Presenter: Daniel Connolly (Princeton)
Discussant: John Jost (NYU)
Abstract: The high level of inequality of income and wealth across individuals, groups, and nations, is widely and credibly regarded as among the most fundamental problems facing humanity. Yet public outrage about inequality remains surprisingly limited, even among those who are disadvantaged by it. We argue that this disconnect arises from basic features of human social cognition which evolved for interpersonal interactions in small groups. The key features of social cognition are: (i) a focus on local notions of equality and equity between socially connected individuals, rather than across society at large; (ii) group identification, which directs attention to inequality between groups rather than ‘pure’ inequality across the broader population; and (iii) what we call an i-frame bias—a tendency to explain social outcomes as the product of individual behaviors. We examine how the very wealthy exploit these features of social cognition to shape the political and policy landscape.
Presenter: Daniel Urquijo (European University Institute)
Discussant: Max Palmer (Boston University)
Abstract: This paper studies the emergence of punitive moral legislation and its potential to catalyze broader culturally conservative changes. We posit that increasing violations of moral norms can mobilize norm-upholders to protect them through law. This mobilization, in turn, generates organizational and discursive resources that can be co-opted by members of the upholder coalition to advance their broader political agendas. We focus on the case of alcohol prohibition in the United States—a landmark victory for evangelical Protestants who sought to codify their morals into law. We argue that German and Irish immigration disrupted Temperance social order in rural America, spurring local alcohol bans as a defense against perceived norm violations by immigrants. We confirm this using a shift-share instrumental variable design. We then examine how Prohibition affected the spread of other culturally conservative movements, particularly nativism. Leveraging staggered state-by-state adoption of dry laws, we show that Prohibition significantly increased conservative voting in Congress on cultural issues, chiefly immigration, while leaving economic voting unchanged. This historical case demonstrates how moral crusades emerge to protect social order and how their success can generate broader reactionary reforms.
Presenter: Amytess Girgis (University of Oxford)
Discussant: Tamara Lee (Rutgers University)
Abstract: How can precarious workers sustain labor campaigns amid protracted union busting and hostile political economic conditions? Scholars have pointed to the importance of worker-led ‘organizing approaches’ for union revitalization, but these accounts tend to excise the role of identity-based contestation, both within and outside the workplace, in shaping and sustaining such approaches. This article traces how Starbucks workers in the U.S. developed an intersectional organizing strategy, shaped by their social identities and political values, to sustain and grow the union amid high turnover, wide geographic spread, extreme union-busting, and delayed contract bargaining. Drawing on interviews, organizing documents, and observation of meetings and actions from July 2022 – November 2025, I demonstrate that this strategy informed how workers (1) developed inclusive and motivating priorities, (2) sustained and expanded organizing capacity through mobilization, and (3) strengthened internal participation and democracy. These findings problematize portrayals of social identity as merely predisposing workers to organize and instead use identity to understand why, how, and with whom workers deploy ‘organizing approaches’ in the absence of institutionalized labor relations. Theoretically, the Starbucks case demonstrates the utility of applying a broader contentious politics framework, informed by critical race theory and intersectionality, to expand how scholars define and analyze labor contestation
Presenter: Carlos Lastra-Anadón (IE University)
Discussant: Melissa Lyon (University at Albany)
Abstract: We examine how childhood exposure to teacher collective bargaining laws shapes long-run political behavior. A long tradition of research shows that public policies generate “policy feedbacks” that influence citizens’ participation and identities. We focus on public schools as a central socializing institution and study the consequences of state laws, adopted beginning in the 1960s, that required school districts to bargain collectively with teachers’ unions. These reforms expanded workplace democracy for teachers, but may also have shaped the political development of students educated under them. Leveraging staggered adoption of duty-to-bargain laws in a cross-cohort difference-in-differences design, we estimate the long-term effects of exposure during childhood. We find that such exposure reduces adult voter turnout by roughly 2 percentage points, with effects concentrated among men. At the same time, exposure increases the likelihood of identifying as a Democrat rather than a Republican. These results show that public sector labor law generates durable feedback effects on both political participation and partisan identity.
Presenter: Marco Mari (Politecnico di Milano, MIT)
Discussant: Mark Mizruchi
Abstract: Political economy treats firms as institution-takers. This paper asks when American firms become institution-makers. At regional scale, institutional environments are not always settled—new industries lack governing arrangements, declining communities face collapsed order, abandoned places have lost coordination. In these vacuums, firms with sufficient capability and agency produce institutional order directly. I call this corporate statecraft. Four American cases illustrate: Terman's Stanford built Silicon Valley's institutional infrastructure; Miller's Cummins transformed Columbus, Indiana through patient capital and civic investment; Pittsburgh's corporate elite reconstructed the region after steel's collapse; Long's American Woolen is attempting to rebuild both a textile ecosystem and a distressed Connecticut community. The cases vary in orientation—open statecraft enabling broad participation versus closed statecraft entrenching incumbents—with consequences for who gains and who loses. The inquiry is conditional: when does corporate statecraft emerge? But the answer is constitutive: the capacity to produce institutional order reveals the political nature of the firm.
Presenter: Alon Jasper (Tel Aviv)
Discussant: Brian Highsmith
Abstract: Governmental ownership of public utilities occupies an uneasy place in American legal and political thought. For decades, debates have focused on whether public provisioning can match private efficiency and whether it threatens the public–private boundary associated with liberty and democracy. On these terms, governmental ownership has been marginalized and dismissed as a policy option. Both critiques, however, rest on an underexamined assumption: that governmental ownership functions merely as a substitute for regulation. This Article argues instead that governmental ownership enables distinct regulatory capacities. It allows direct regulation through contracts, competition, and infrastructure, and it generates indirect regulatory effects when it operates as a credible alternative to administrative regulation. The prospect of public ownership reshapes regulatory bargaining, constraining private incumbents, administrative agencies, and even courts, while expanding the range of available regulatory tools. Using nineteenth-century railroad governance as a case study, the Article shows how keeping governmental ownership “on the table” exerted a pull-push effect on regulatory design. Efforts to avoid public ownership encouraged the development of administrative regulation, while the possibility of ownership expanded the legal imagination of regulatory experimentation. This historical dynamic remains relevant today. As interest in public options resurfaces in sectors such as healthcare, energy, broadband, and artificial intelligence, governmental ownership should be understood not as an anachronism, but as a persistent force shaping regulatory possibilities and a potential safeguard for the administrative state.
Presenter: Nicolas Florez (University of Michigan)
Discussant: Margaret Weir (Brown University)
Abstract: Why have some American metropolitan areas succeeded in developing regionally integrated public transit systems while others have adopted localist, fragmented transit policy regimes? I argue that contemporary differences in metropolitan transit coordination are rooted in how subnational elected officials responded to the postwar racial diversification of urban areas. I conceptualize the mid-century transition from privately operated to publicly governed transit as a critical juncture in metropolitan political development, during which local and state officials exercised substantial discretion over transit governance. Variation in exposure to the Second Great Migration between 1940 and 1970 served as a key differentiating force at this juncture, shaping whether officials pursued regionally integrated or locally insulated transit institutions. Using a shift–share measure of Great Migration exposure and contemporary data on transit agencies and their finances, I show that metropolitan areas receiving larger Black migrant inflows exhibit significantly more fragmented transit governance today, including a greater number of transit agencies and less coordinated allocation of local transit funding. These findings demonstrate how anti-Black racism at a formative moment in policy development produced durable institutional legacies in a fundamentally metropolitan policy.
Presenter: Rebekah Jones (University of California, Berkeley)
Discussant: John Pfaff (Fordham University)
Abstract: What explains local variation in incarceration rates? While local governments play a central role in the criminal justice system, most scholarship has focused on state and federal policy, obscuring the role of counties in driving the American prison boom. This paper addresses that gap by applying leading theoretical frameworks to over thirty years of county-level penal policy choices across counties. I show that more variation in incarceration rates occurs within states than across them, underscoring the need to examine local–rather than solely state-level determinants of punishment. I revisit dominant accounts of the prison boom by distinguishing between relative changes over time and absolute levels of violent crime and prison admissions. Relative measures confirm prior findings that incarceration failed to decline alongside post-1990s crime drops, suggesting a decoupling between crime and punishment. Yet absolute comparisons reveal a different reality: in most counties, violent crime consistently outpaced prison admissions, with few ever approaching parity between the two. To explain divergent local trajectories, I examine the role of public opinion and novel measures of local capacity. Using California ballot initiative turnout data, I find limited evidence that county public opinion drove incarceration growth. Instead, original historical court statistics–capturing caseloads and law enforcement capacity–show that local capacity to respond to high levels of violence strongly predicts prison admissions as well as the nature of the response. These findings complicate the dominant over-punitive narrative, reframing mass incarceration as a product of weak and uneven local capacity-building rather than a uniform overreaction to crime decline, with important implications for understanding its distinct repressive character.
Presenter: Jonas Fischer (University of Oxford)
Discussant: Matto Mildenberger (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Abstract: Albeit its effectiveness is contested, firms increasingly disclose their carbon emissions and broader environmental performance indicators. Why do firms voluntarily disclose? We extend existing theories that firms self-regulate in response to the threat of regulation by arguing that firms use voluntary disclosures as a form of strategic accommodation. By disclosing information, firms seek to signal to policymakers that stringent regulations are unnecessary. To test our theory, we examine the responses of U.S. public firms to a mandatory disclosure rule proposed by the SEC in 2022. Using a novel directed and focused measure of firm lobbying, we show that firms that lobbied against mandatory disclosure were more likely to voluntarily disclose in the same period. We show that voluntary disclosures constitute a mechanism for firms to exert influence on policymaking, akin to lobbying.
Presenter: Ximena Benavides (University of Georgia)
Discussant: Jacob Hacker (Yale)
Abstract: The United States leads the world in biomedical innovation, yet this scientific dominance has not translated into broad access to health technologies. Persistent barriers—from neglected disease areas to unaffordable treatments and restricted knowledge flows—coexist with decades of bipartisan policy attention. This Article examines the institutional and legal dynamics that sustain this gap. Tracing the political economy of U.S. biomedical innovation since the 1950s, the Article shows how pluralistic innovation levers have reshaped the meaning of scientific progress, revealing a stark paradox. Although taxpayer funding remains central to biomedical research, the turn toward financialized research and development has intensified, rather than resolved, access problems. Progress has increasingly been defined by commercialization metrics and investor returns rather than health outcomes. The Article proposes a cross-disciplinary governance framework that reorients biomedical innovation toward structural access as a directional principle, calling for early-stage accountability mechanisms to counterbalance financialized conceptions of progress.
Presenter: Paul Lendway (Stanford University)
Discussant: Jane Gingrich (University of Oxford)
Abstract: Advances in AI are transforming work. As experts ranging from business leaders to economists try to predict AI’s impact on the labor market, how do these various forecasts shape political behavior? At stake is the possibility that expert labor market predictions impact important political outcomes regardless of whether the theorized changes take hold. To probe this, we run a novel U.S. sample assessing how varying forecasts surrounding the economic impact of AI on jobs shapes political attitudes. First, we show that subjects with higher populist attitudes are more likely to attribute AI-induced job losses to business elites, tech industry elites, politicians, and public policies. Second, subjects who more greatly value equality are more likely to respond to AI-induced job losses with support for increasing federal taxes on the wealthy. Finally, AI-induced job increases result in lower mass support for breaking up large companies. These results illustrate how differences in forecasts and preexisting technomoral values can condition mass responses to advances in AI on matters ranging from taxing the rich to corporate regulatory policy.
Presenter: Antonia Gordon (Michigan State)
Discussant: Jonathan Collins (Columbia University)
Abstract: Small cities face structural barriers to economic diversification, leaving local labor markets dependent on small businesses, low-wage service work, or a single dominant industry. As residents commute to regional job centers, population decline and a shrinking tax base can further destabilize these communities. In many Rust Belt small cities, however, public K–12 education systems function as one of the largest and most stable employers. Because schools receive substantial state and federal funding—most of which is allocated to staffing—education policy plays a central role in shaping local labor markets. This paper examines how education reform policies affect labor market conditions in small cities, focusing on case studies of public-school districts in Camden, New Jersey, and Muskegon Heights, Michigan. Both communities have relied heavily on public education as a primary labor industry and have experienced major restructuring, including state takeovers, charter conversions, and school closures. The study analyzes how such reforms reshape employment patterns and broader economic stability over time.
No results found.






